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SAFEGUARDING THE PROMISE OFKINGSLEY FOR
CONDITIONS OFCONFINEMENT
Hanna Rutkowski*
Nearly five million individuals are admitted to America’s jails each year, and
at any given time, two-thirds of those held in jail have not been convicted of a
crime. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, these pretrial detainees are
functionally protected by the same standard as convicted prisoners, despite
the fact that they are formally protected by different constitutional amend-
ments. A 2015 decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, declared that a different
standard would apply to pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners in the
context of use of force: consistent with the Constitution’s mandate that they
not be punished at all, pretrial detainees would no longer need to demon-
strate that officials subjectively intended to harm them, only that the force
they applied was objectively unreasonable. Courts of appeals have begun to
extend this shift to claims involving conditions of confinement, but the prom-
ise of that move is threatened by the availability of a cost defense for officials
who respond reasonably to detainees’ needs given the resource constraints
they face. This Note argues that pretrial detainees can only be adequately
protected from punishment if the reasonable response includes an affirmative
duty to notify superiors of those constraints.
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INTRODUCTION
Jeffrey Pendleton died of COVID-19 in early April 2020 while shackled
to his bed at a Chicago hospital, after contracting the disease while awaiting
trial at the Cook County Jail.1 As of November 6, 2020, he is one of seven
confirmed deaths in Cook County Jail custody, and one of over 500 positive
cases.2 While the COVID-19 pandemic has shed light on one life-threatening
risk faced by incarcerated individuals, there are countless other risks that ac-
company the American system of pretrial detention. There are other people
like Jeremy Laintz, whose failure to report for a drug test while out on bond
ultimately cost him not only his liberty but also part of a lung and portions
of six toes.3
Pendleton and Laintz are not alone. Over ten million admissions are
made to America’s jails every year, corresponding to at least 4.9 million indi-
viduals.4 At any given time, about two-thirds of those held in jails are pretrial
1. Pascal Sabino, Family of Jailed Coronavirus Victim Sues Cook County Sheriff’s Office:
‘He Died in Shackles,’ BLOCK CLUB CHI. (Apr. 10, 2020, 10:03 AM),
https://blockclubchicago.org/2020/04/10/family-of-jailed-covid-19-victim-sues-cook-county-
sheriffs-office-he-died-in-shackles/ [https://perma.cc/8DPF-KK26].
2. COVID-19 Jail/Prison Confirmed Cases and Deaths, UCLA L. COVID-19 BEHIND
BARS DATA PROJECT, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1X6uJkXXS-
O6eePLxw2e4JeRtM41uPZ2eRcOA_HkPVTk (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (data
pulled on Nov. 6, 2020). Nationally, there have been over 166,700 confirmed cases and 1,253
deaths from COVID-19 amongst residents of America’s jails and prisons. Id.
3. Laintz had become addicted to prescription opioids and then to heroin after an inju-
ry to his wrist. Jail staff initially prescribed medications for withdrawal, but when his condition
deteriorated over the following weeks, they refused to take him to the hospital. Only after a
sergeant at the jail overruled the medical staff was he finally admitted; diagnosed with dehydra-
tion, sepsis, pneumonia, and acute renal and respiratory failure; and airlifted in a medically
induced coma. Steve Coll, The Jail Health-Care Crisis, NEW YORKER (Feb. 25, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/04/the-jail-health-care-crisis
[https://perma.cc/RY6X-BYJX].
4. ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 253044, JAIL INMATES
IN 2018, at 2 tbl.1 (2020), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji18.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RQS9-YJT7]; Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Arrest, Release, Repeat: How Police and Jails Are
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detainees—individuals who have not yet been convicted of a crime.5 Many of
these individuals suffer from underlying physical and mental health condi-
tions that require ongoing treatment and care.6 The challenges pretrial de-
tainees face are exacerbated by a persistent lack of funding for medical and
mental healthcare; a 2019 article in the Annals of Internal Medicine describes
“a growing epidemic of inadequate health care in U.S. prisons,” with shrink-
ing budgets, huge populations, and for-profit healthcare contracts all con-
tributing to the problem.7 Jails experience even greater challenges because of
their high levels of detainee turnover.8 Each newly admitted detainee has the
potential to pose a difficult-to-treat challenge for the facility’s meager
healthcare staff.9 Moreover, the level of care available may depend on the
fortuity of where the individual happens to be incarcerated, since states vary
dramatically in the resources and staffing they devote to medical care.10
The COVID-19 crisis offers an important lesson in the tragedy that can
result when facilities lack sufficient resources to provide adequate care to all
those who need it.11 This Note is about what happens when understaffed and
underresourced jails fail to meet the medical needs of those in their care and
the constitutional law that governs the resulting claims. While the need for
constitutional protections for pretrial detainees is clear, the interpretation of
the constitutional provision that provides protection remains unsettled.
Misused to Respond to Social Problems, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html [https://perma.cc/3PZA-PU87].
5. ZENG, supra note 4, at 6 tbl.4.
6. Coll, supra note 3, at 30 (“According to a study released in 2017 by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, nearly half the people held in jails suffer from some kind of mental illness,
and more than a quarter have a severe condition, such as bipolar disorder.”).
7. Ashley Hurst, Brenda Castañeda & Erika Ramsdale, Deliberate Indifference: Inade-
quate Health Care in U.S. Prisons, 170 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 563, 563–64 (2019); see also
Jeffrey E. Keller, Medical Jail Fails, MEDPAGE TODAY (June 18, 2019),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/blogs/doing-time/80539 [https://perma.cc/L3E9-SX28].
8. Coll, supra note 3, at 30.
9. See id.
10. For example, a 2017 fifty-state survey from the Pew Charitable Trust found that av-
erage fiscal year spending on medical, dental, mental health, and substance abuse treatment
was $5,720 per inmate, but ranged from $2,173 in Louisiana to $19,796 in California. PEW
CHARITABLE TRS., PRISON HEALTH CARE: COSTS AND QUALITY 6, 8 fig.2 (2017), http://www
.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2017/10/sfh_prison_health_care_costs_and_quality_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BK8Z-UAEY]. The average number of full-time medical employees per
1,000 inmates ranged from 19 in Oklahoma to 87 in NewMexico. Id. at 101 tbl.c.7.
11. See, e.g., Alice Park & Jeffrey Kluger, The Coronavirus Pandemic Is Forcing U.S. Doc-
tors to Ration Care for All Patients, TIME (Apr. 22, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://time.com
/5825145/coronavirus-rationing-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/NLV4-YACF]; Eric Westervelt,
‘Shocking, Heartbreaking’ Coronavirus Outbreak in Calif. Prison Alarms Health Experts, NPR




Convicted prisoners are protected by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment.12 Pretrial detainees, on the other
hand, are protected by the general due process guarantees of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.13 The cruelty of punishment is not a relevant con-
sideration for pretrial detainees, because absent a conviction, they cannot be
punished at all.14 The Supreme Court, however, has long imported the
Eighth Amendment doctrine for convicted prisoners into the Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine for pretrial detainees.15 Due process claims brought by
pretrial detainees generally come in two forms: those concerning use of force
and those concerning conditions of confinement.16 Prototypical conditions
claims involve the environment and living situation behind bars (including
medical care).17 Use-of-force claims typically involve the level or type of
force employed to maintain safety and security, such as that needed to re-
move a noncompliant prisoner from their cell or to break up a fight.18
Under current Supreme Court doctrine, pretrial detainees effectively
have the same rights when it comes to their conditions of confinement as
those who have been convicted of a crime. They may be considered “inno-
cent until proven guilty,” but as long as officials do not act wantonly with re-
spect to the conditions of their confinement, those officials cannot be found
liable for the damages that result.19 Increased protection as to conditions
may be on the horizon. In 2015, the Court decided Kingsley v. Hendrickson, a
suit brought by a pretrial detainee alleging that officers used excessive force
during a cell extraction.20 The Court held that, in the context of use of force,
pretrial detainees are protected by a higher standard than the standard ap-
plied to convicted prisoners, one in which wanton conduct or intent to harm
the prisoner is not required for liability.21
The initial question, therefore, is whether and how the logic of Kingsley
applies to conditions. There is reason to believe that the logic of the decision
applies even more strongly in the context of claims challenging conditions of
12. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
13. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 579–80 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015).
15. See infra Section I.A.
16. These two types of claims represent the analogues of claims brought by convicted
prisoners under the Eighth Amendment. See infra notes 49–50 and accompanying text. Pretrial
detainees can bring other claims under the Due Process Clause, but those other claims are not
the focus of this Note. See, e.g., Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2005)
(finding that a one-dollar-per-day charge to a pretrial detainee’s account did not violate his
procedural due process rights).
17. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
18. See, e.g., Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012); Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d
225, 232–33 (4th Cir. 2008).
19. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
20. 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015).
21. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.
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confinement than it does to claims involving use of force,22 but courts of ap-
peals remain split on whether and exactly how to extend Kingsley.23 Against
that background, this Note argues that even if Kingsley is extended to condi-
tions of confinement, it may not adequately protect the constitutional rights
of pretrial detainees to be free from punishment. The gravamen of the Kings-
ley decision is that officials can be held accountable when they act unreason-
ably toward a detainee, regardless of whether they intended to harm the
detainee. The problem is that officials who respond reasonably given the re-
source constraints they face may be able to assert a “cost defense,” leaving
detainees with no one to sue when their injuries result from scarcity.24
Part I provides a historical overview of the Court’s jurisprudence involv-
ing both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. It explains that, while
these two groups are formally protected by different constitutional amend-
ments, the claims they brought were largely treated as functionally equiva-
lent prior to Kingsley. Part I also dives into the resurgent distinction after
Kingsley and briefly introduces the potential cost defense. Part II considers
the impact of Kingsley on conditions-of-confinement claims, covering
whether and how it has been extended outside the context of use of force and
analyzing its vulnerability to the cost defense. Part III explores and rejects
two possible responses to that vulnerability before proposing an additional
safeguard based on tort principles: an information-forcing affirmative duty
to notify as part of any reasonable response.
I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS AND THEKINGSLEY SCHISM
Though convicted prisoners file claims under the Eighth Amendment
while pretrial detainees file claims under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ment, courts have historically treated these two types of claims as largely in-
terchangeable. Kingsley changed this for claims involving use of force,
imposing heightened protections for pretrial detainees. It remains unclear
whether these heightened protections will be extended to claims involving
conditions of confinement. To understand how Kingsley may impact pretri-
al-conditions claims, it is necessary to understand how the standards for
both use-of-force and conditions claims evolved over time. The case law per-
taining to the two types of claims overlaps significantly, diverging at times
before coming back together.
This Part begins by detailing the theoretical distinction between claims
brought by pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners, as well as the ways the
Supreme Court has collapsed that distinction. It then provides a historical
overview of the standards governing claims for conditions and use of force,
stopping just short of Kingsley. Finally, it introduces some of the obstacles to
bringing a successful claim, including generally applicable challenges such as
22. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
23. See infra Section II.A.
24. See infra Section I.C.
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qualified immunity as well as the availability of a conditions-specific cost de-
fense for officials who respond reasonably given substantial resource con-
straints.
A. Foundations of Modern Prison Litigation
Although they often reside side by side in our nation’s penal institu-
tions,25 pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners are protected by different
constitutional amendments. The Eighth Amendment protects convicted
prisoners from cruel and unusual punishments, but the Supreme Court has
consistently held that this protection applies only after a person has been
convicted of a crime.26 The Amendment places limits on the length and type
of sentence a judge can impose,27 as well as the treatment that convicted
prisoners are subjected to during the term of that sentence.28 Pretrial detain-
ees, on the other hand, are protected only by the general guarantees of due
process embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.29
“Only” is a bit of a misnomer because, in theory, pretrial detainees
should receive heightened protections. Justice Rehnquist articulated the con-
stitutional distinction between the two groups in Bell v. Wolfish: pretrial de-
tainees have not yet had an adjudication of guilt, and their due process rights
require such an adjudication before any punishment can be imposed. Since
the Eighth Amendment only applies to punishment, it does not apply to pre-
trial detainees.30 Bell was a class action brought by pretrial detainees in New
York City challenging the conditions of their confinement.31 Specifically, the
suit challenged the practice of “double-bunking” detainees in rooms with a
“total floor space of approximately 75 square feet,”32 which is less than the
25. Particularly in state jails, which hold both pretrial detainees and postconviction in-
mates serving short sentences. See NATALIE R. ORTIZ, NAT’L ASS’N OF CNTYS., COUNTY JAILS
AT A CROSSROADS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE JAIL POPULATION AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 5
(2015), https://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/Final%20paper_County%20Jails
%20at%20a%20Crossroads_8.10.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD8T-635F].
26. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979).
27. Justice Thomas has stated that he believes this is all the Eighth Amendment protects.
See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“As an original matter, therefore, this case would be an easy one for me: Because the unfortu-
nate attack that befell petitioner was not part of his sentence, it did not constitute ‘punishment’
under the Eighth Amendment.”).
28. Id. at 832 (majority opinion); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–04 (1976).
29. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 n.16; cf. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (explain-
ing that for claims alleging that the police used excessive force against free citizens, the Fourth
Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, applies, because it “provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection”).
30. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535 & n.16.
31. Id. at 523.
32. Id. at 541.
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area covered by two king beds.33 Reasoning that the Fourteenth Amendment
served as a bar to punishment for pretrial detainees, the Court established a
key distinction between unconstitutional punishments and constitutional
regulatory restraints, such as those needed to maintain security in a pretrial
detention facility.34 To determine which of those categories a particular con-
dition of confinement falls within, a court must first consider whether the
imposition can be explained by a legitimate governmental purpose other
than punishment.35 Conditions that cannot be justified by these legitimate
goals create an inference of punishment, even when there is no direct evi-
dence of penal intent.36
After conceding that the right combination of particularly outrageous
conditions might run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court con-
cluded that the “double-bunking” conditions in Bell did not constitute a vio-
lation.37 The Court emphasized that detainees spent only seven or eight
hours a day in their cells and that most detainees were released within sixty
days.38 The Court found that these conditions were neither intentionally im-
posed as punishment nor excessive in relation to the legitimate need to man-
age the facility.39 Still, Bell stood for the important proposition that pretrial
detainees were protected by a different standard than convicted prisoners,
and under that standard, they could not be punished at all.
Even as courts recognized that Bell imposed a hierarchical relationship
between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments—where protections for
pretrial detainees must be at least as strong as for convicted prisoners—
judges applied functionally the same test for decades.40 Four years after Bell,
the Supreme Court held in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital
that the Eighth Amendment functioned as a floor for the Fourteenth.41 But
the Court in Revere did not further define a standard for pretrial detainees,
because it found that the care provided by the defendants was adequate un-
33. See A Guide to Square Footage w/ Real Life Examples, PLATINUM PROPS. (May 30,
2014), https://www.platinumpropertiesnyc.com/blog/guide-square-footage-w-real-life-
examples [https://perma.cc/3FDB-3ZZ5].
34. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.
35. Id. at 538.
36. Id. at 539.
37. Id. at 542 (“While confining a given number of people in . . . such a manner as to
cause them to endure genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time might
raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause . . . .”).
38. Id. at 543.
39. See id. at 540–43.
40. See Margo Schlanger, The Constitutional Law of Incarceration, Reconfigured, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 357, 364 (2018) (“Between 1979 (Bell) and 2015 (Kingsley), the Supreme
Court offered little guidance on the difference between pretrial and post-conviction standards,
instead offering only the comment that ‘due process rights . . . are at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.’ ” (quoting City of Revere v. Mass.
Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983))).
41. Id.
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der any standard.42 As a result, lower courts were left with virtually no guid-
ance regarding the difference between the Amendments and treated them as
if they imposed the same protections.43
Early prison-litigation cases considered whether convicted prisoners44
have any constitutional rights at all. In the 1871 case Ruffin v. Common-
wealth, Virginia’s highest court essentially answered in the negative, holding
that a prisoner was civilly dead because he had forfeited his constitutional
protections when he committed the crimes for which he was imprisoned.45
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, began to chip away at this principle in
1941 in Ex Parte Hull, establishing that the government could not impede a
prisoner’s right to file a habeas petition in federal courts.46 In 1962, the Court
incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states, extending its protec-
tions to state as well as federal prisoners.47 Other constitutional protections
for prisoners also began to be recognized during this time.48
With a right to bring claims under the Constitution thus firmly estab-
lished, doctrinal attention shifted to the content of those constitutional pro-
tections. Eighth Amendment claims fall largely into two distinct categories:
claims involving conditions of confinement and claims involving use of
force. A conditions claim can be based on almost any aspect of a prisoner’s
living situation, such as his cell’s temperature, vermin, lack of sunlight, ina-
bility to access medical care, and the ability of officials to keep prisoners safe
from sexual abuse and violence perpetrated by fellow inmates.49 Use-of-force
claims, on the other hand, might involve whether it was appropriate to use a
taser in a cell extraction or deadly weapons in response to a riot.50 Both types
of claims can involve decisionmaking by individual actors, but the circum-
stances under which those actors make those decisions may vary greatly. The
Court has given mixed signals about whether these distinctions are im-
portant.51
42. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244–45 (1983).
43. Schlanger, supra note 40, at 364.
44. Because nearly all the major Supreme Court cases during this period of development
involved convicted prisoners, this Section uses the term “prisoner” throughout. The salient
differences between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees will be reexamined in Section
I.D.
45. 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) (“He is civiliter mortuus.”).
46. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
47. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
48. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (holding that racially segregated
state prisons violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Cooper v.
Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (holding that a state prisoner could bring a claim assert-
ing that his religious freedom was infringed in violation of the First Amendment).
49. Schlanger, supra note 40, at 363; see also, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825
(1994); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312 (1986).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 62–72.
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B. Parallel Development of Standards for Conditions of Confinement and
Use of Force
The grounding principles for both conditions and use of force were es-
tablished in Jackson v. Bishop, an Eighth Circuit decision authored by then-
Judge Blackmun.52 In finding whipping to be per se unconstitutional, he
wrote that it “offend[ed] contemporary concepts of decency and human dig-
nity” as well as “good conscience and fundamental fairness.”53 These princi-
ples became the touchstone of the Supreme Court’s modern Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, with layers of gloss depending on the specifics of
the claim.
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court announced that a “deliberate
indifference” standard governed whether conditions of confinement violated
the Eighth Amendment. The Court established the standard in Estelle v.
Gamble, a case in which a convicted prisoner brought a claim for inadequate
medical care.54 The Court first found that inmates had to rely on prison offi-
cials to meet their medical needs and that the failure of officials to meet
those needs could result in torture or even death.55 It then held that condi-
tions claims like those involving inadequate medical care would fall under a
new standard: deliberate indifference.56 Proving deliberate indifference would
require a plaintiff to demonstrate “wanton infliction of unnecessary pain”;
mere negligence would not be enough to establish a violation.57 After anoth-
er two decades, the Court clarified in Farmer v. Brennan that deliberate in-
difference was akin to criminal recklessness.58
The jurisprudence on the other side of the Eighth Amendment—use of
force—evolved simultaneously, eventually coalescing into a two-part test.
Whitley v. Albers was a case involving use of force in the context of a prison
riot.59 Mirroring the Estelle Court’s approach to conditions, the Whitley
Court adopted the wanton-conduct standard announced in Jackson v. Bishop
and held that a showing of wantonness was required to establish a constitu-
tional violation involving excessive force.60 TheWhitley Court, however, rea-
52. 404 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir. 1968).
53. Jackson, 404 F.2d. at 579.
54. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
55. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his med-
ical needs . . . . In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce physical ‘torture or a lin-
gering death’ . . . In less serious cases, denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering
which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose.”).
56. Id. at 104.
57. Id. at 105.
58. 511 U.S. 825, 839–40 (1994) (“That said, subjective recklessness as used in the crim-
inal law is a familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause as interpreted in our cases, and we adopt it as the test for ‘deliberate
indifference’ under the Eighth Amendment.”).
59. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
60. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
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soned that not all cases involving an objectively unnecessary use of force rose
to the level of wantonness; a subjective intent to inflict harm was necessary.61
To illustrate its point, the Court contrasted the high-stakes, emergent-
threat situation of a riot with the slow-moving medical conditions scenario
in Estelle. The majority reasoned that, in urgent moments, prison staff fre-
quently must make decisions to use force without a chance to fully consider
the appropriate level of force to employ.62 In these high-pressure situations,
staff might mistakenly use force that was not retrospectively justified.63 Un-
der the Whitley standard, these mistakes, while objectively unreasonable,
would not constitute Eighth Amendment violations.64 In cases involving ur-
gency, therefore, the plaintiff would need to show not only that the force
employed was objectively unreasonable but also that it was employed “mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”65
Whitley’s heavy focus on exigency and the Court’s use of Estelle to draw
a distinction between a riot and general problems with prison conditions
suggested the new subjective-intent requirement might not apply to condi-
tions claims. But in 1991, the Court extended the two-part Whitley test to a
conditions-of-confinement claim.66 In Wilson v. Seiter, the majority found
an intent requirement in the text of the Eighth Amendment.67 Reasoning
that the Amendment banned only punishment, the Court wrote that “[i]f the
pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the
sentencing judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting
officer before it can qualify.”68 In other words, officials cannot punish a pris-
oner unless they mean to. The deliberate-indifference standard for condi-
tions claims, the Court wrote, already encompassed this subjective
requirement;69 indeed, the Court argued that the subjective element had
been present ever since it announced the deliberate-indifference standard in
Estelle.70 Both use-of-force and conditions claims, therefore, would have a
subjective and an objective component,71 but the nature of the subjective
61. Id. at 319–21.
62. Id. at 320.
63. Id. (“[A] deliberate indifference standard does not adequately capture the im-
portance of such competing obligations, or convey the appropriate hesitancy to critique in
hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pressure, and frequently without the lux-
ury of a second chance.”).
64. See id. at 322.
65. Id. at 320–21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
66. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991).
67. Id. at 300.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 302–03.
70. Id. at 297 (“We rejected, however, the inmate’s claim in [Estelle] that prison doctors
had inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by inadequately attending to his medical needs—
because he had failed to establish that they possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”).
71. See id. at 297–300.
Rethinking the Reasonable Response
component would differ slightly between the two as a result of the height-
ened exigency present in use-of-force claims.72
After Wilson, the deliberate-indifference standard limits Eighth
Amendment liability for denying humane conditions of confinement to sce-
narios where a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial risk of
serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures
to abate it.”73 The subjective requirement is encompassed in the disregard of
a known and substantial risk. The objective component is captured by the
seriousness of the harm.74
C. Obstacles to Bringing a Successful Conditions Claim
In addition to making an adequate showing of deliberate indifference,
any prisoner bringing a claim must contend with both sovereign immunity
for states and qualified immunity for individual state officials. Convicted
prisoners and pretrial detainees cannot bring claims against the state itself
because of the Eleventh Amendment’s grant of sovereign immunity.75
Claims therefore must be brought against individual government officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for constitutional
violations perpetrated by officials while they are acting under the color of
state law.76 Even if a convicted prisoner or pretrial detainee brings a claim
that would satisfy the legal standard under the Eighth Amendment or Four-
teenth Amendment, recovery may still be denied under the doctrine of quali-
72. Id. at 302 (“[O]ur cases say that the offending conduct must be wanton. Whitley
makes clear, however, that in this context wantonness does not have a fixed meaning but must
be determined with ‘due regard for differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth
Amendment objection is lodged.’ ” (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986))).
Around the same time as Wilson, the Court found that even much less intensive disruptions
than a riot could provide the kind of exigent circumstances needed to justify a subjective
standard in the use-of-force context. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). Whitley
involved a riot in a cellblock with two hundred inmates, an official held hostage, and officers
wielding shotguns. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 314–16 (1986). Hudson, on the other hand,
involved an inmate who was handcuffed and being escorted to lockdown by two guards when
they punched him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4. Nevertheless,
the same standard applied. Id. at 6–7 (“Many of the concerns underlying our holding in Whit-
ley arise whenever guards use force to keep order. Whether the prison disturbance is a riot or a
lesser disruption, corrections officers must balance the need ‘to maintain or restore discipline’
through force against the risk of injury to inmates. Both situations may require prison officials
to act quickly and decisively.”).
73. Farmer vs. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).
74. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.
75. See generally 2 IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, STATE &
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILITY § 2:21(A), Westlaw (July 2020 update). The
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by citizens of another state. U.S. CONST. amend.
XI. The Supreme Court has interpreted it, however, as also encompassing suits against a state
by its own citizens. BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 75.
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fied immunity, which protects officials from liability unless the constitution-
al violation is clearly established under existing law.77
While sovereign immunity for states and qualified immunity for indi-
viduals apply with equal force to all Eighth Amendment claims, an addition-
al, potentially insurmountable, hurdle stands in the way of conditions
claims: the availability of a “cost defense.” Peralta v. Dillard, a 2014 en banc
decision from the Ninth Circuit, established the rule that officials cannot be
held liable in conditions-of-confinement claims brought under the Eighth
Amendment when they respond reasonably to scarce resources.78 Cion Ado-
nis Peralta was a convicted prisoner, housed in the California state prison
system, at a facility that had approximately one dentist for every two thou-
sand inmates, more than double the ratio outlined in state policy.79 Despite
suffering from severe pain, bleeding gums, and a number of cavities, Peralta
spent months on a waiting list before seeing a dentist. During that wait, Per-
alta periodically received ibuprofen, but not antibiotics, to treat his perio-
dontal disease.80 By the time he finally had his teeth cleaned, eighteen
months after he first requested care, Peralta had sustained severe bone loss in
his jaw.81
Peralta brought a § 1983 claim for damages against the prison’s chief
dental officer, its chief medical officer, and the dentist who provided care,
Doctor Brooks.82 The claim against Brooks is most relevant because it estab-
lished the cost defense. Relying on the Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement precedents, the Peralta majority explained that prison officials
must “act wantonly” to meet the standard of deliberate indifference, and
whether an official acted wantonly depends on the “constraints” he faced.83
Given the serious understaffing and particular challenges of providing dental
care in prison,84 the court rejected what it called Peralta’s attempt to “hold
Brooks personally liable for failing to give Peralta care that Brooks would
have found impossible to provide.”85 In short, Brooks was insulated from li-
ability because he responded reasonably given the inadequate funding avail-
able from the state.
77. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738–39 (2002) (finding an Eighth Amend-
ment violation and going on to consider whether the right was clearly established). Another
major obstacle is the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See generally Darryl M. James, Comment,
Reforming Prison Litigation Reform: Reclaiming Equal Access to Justice for Incarcerated Persons
in America, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 465 (2011).
78. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
79. Id. at 1081.
80. Id.; id. at 1090 (Christen, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
81. Id. at 1090 (Christen, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
82. Id. at 1081 (majority opinion).
83. Id. at 1082 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991)).
84. Id. (noting that among other factors, “[s]ecurity concerns dictate that only one pris-
oner be in the examination room at a time, even if there’s more than one chair, and that no
prisoner be left alone, lest he try to use dental tools as weapons”).
85. Id. at 1082–83.
Rethinking the Reasonable Response
In dissent, Judge Christen took issue with the majority’s application of
precedent86 and argued that the rule announced would create an insur-
mountable obstacle for prisoners seeking damages.87 She explained that the
new rule removed an important incentive for state officials (who typically
indemnify their employees),88 and that injunctive relief would be an insuffi-
cient remedy for prisoners who had already suffered irreparable harm. After
all, “what good is prospective injunctive relief to a prisoner whose appendix
has burst?”89 Judge Hurwitz, dissenting separately, explained that the rule
might entirely foreclose recovery for injuries and death caused by inadequate
funding.90
Peralta created a problem: if state actors can be saved from liability for
conditions claims by asserting a cost defense, and practically all jails have
major resource issues, then detainees injured by unconstitutionally poor jail
conditions can never recover. Peralta remains largely confined to the Ninth
Circuit, though district courts in at least the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have
applied it to conditions claims.91 Given the systemic underfunding of medi-
cal care in jails and prisons92 and the resource gaps exposed by COVID-19, it
also seems likely that the Supreme Court will have to reckon with the cost
defense at some point in the near future. Funding concerns are typically not
involved in claims involving excessive force, so the issue was not on table in
Kingsley. However, the cost defense could radically alter the application of
Kingsley to conditions claims.
86. Judge Christen pointed to Jones v. Johnson as standing for the proposition that
“[b]udgetary constraints . . . do not justify cruel and unusual punishment.” Id. at 1092 (Chris-
ten, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (quoting 781 F.2d 769, 771–72 (9th Cir.
1986)). She also cited Snow v. McDaniel as evidence of the fact that this proposition was equal-
ly applicable in suits for damages as it was for suits seeking injunctive relief. Id. (citing 681 F.3d
978, 985–87 (9th Cir. 2012)). The majority had held that Peralta was protected by his ability to
seek a forward-looking injunction, but that the cost defense precluded liability for backward-
looking damages. Id. at 1083 (majority opinion).
87. Id. at 1092–93 (Christen, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (“The majori-
ty’s decision will effectively prevent prisoners from bringing suits for damages against prison
officials who have violated their Eighth Amendment rights . . . those who actually control pris-
on budgets are immune from damage suits [under sovereign immunity] . . . and prison officials
responsible for substandard care or conditions will be shielded by the newly-announced ‘lack-
of-resources’ defense.”).
88. Id. at 1093.
89. Id.; see also id. at 1098 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)
(“[I]njunctive relief provides no comfort to an inmate who loses a limb because of untreated
diabetes.”).
90. Id. at 1101. Both dissents argued that the state’s choice to fully indemnify prison of-
ficials insulated those officials from any unfairness in denying a cost defense. Id. at 1100; id. at
1093 (Christen, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
91. McPartlin v. Roache-McDonald, No. 2:11cv620, 2015 WL 11110947, at *4 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 31, 2015); Cullor v. Baldwin, No. 4:12-cv-00116-JEG-CFB, 2014 WL 12691612, at *11
(S.D. Iowa July 31, 2014). As of August 20, 2020, a total of fourteen cases have adopted the Per-
alta cost defense. Eleven of these are from district courts in the Ninth Circuit.
92. See supra note 7.
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Before the Supreme Court decided Kingsley in 2015, pretrial detainees
were formally protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and thus could not
be punished at all, while convicted prisoners were protected by the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Functionally, howev-
er, courts applied Eighth Amendment standards to both groups. The Court
had determined that use-of-force claims and claims challenging conditions
of confinement both had objective and subjective components, though the
specific subjective standards were different. And the Court had grounded
those subjective components in the text of the Eighth Amendment itself—
specifically, in the word punishment.93 When a pretrial detainee brought a
use-of-force claim in Kingsley, the stage was set for a collision of two key
principles: pretrial detainees could not be punished, but the existing stand-
ard was built on a foundation of punishment.
D. Kingsley v. Hendrickson
In 2010, Michael Kingsley, a pretrial detainee, was being held in a Wis-
consin county jail on a drug charge.94 After Kingsley repeatedly refused of-
ficer requests to remove a paper covering the light above his bed, a group of
four officers forcefully executed a cell extraction.95 After the officers forcibly
removed him from his cell, they carried him to a different cell and placed
him face down on a bunk with his hands handcuffed behind his back.96 Be-
fore the officers left the cell, they tased the handcuffed Kingsley for five sec-
onds.97
Kingsley brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that the officers’ use of exces-
sive force during the incident violated his Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess rights.98 The jury was instructed that in order to convict, they must find
that the officers conducting the cell extraction knew there was an unreasona-
ble risk that their conduct would injure Kingsley and then recklessly disre-
garded his safety by failing to take reasonable measures to protect him.99 The
two-part test included both subjective (knowledge plus reckless disregard)
and objective (failure to take reasonable measures) components.100 The jury
93. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991).
94. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2470 (2015).
95. Id.
96. Id. The jury instruction, rather than the specific facts, was at issue before the Su-
preme Court. Id. at 2471. Kingsley also testified, however, that two officers slammed his head
into the concrete bunk before tasing him, though the officers denied doing so. The officers did
not dispute the other material facts, including the tasing. Id. at 2470.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2470.
99. Id. at 2471.
100. While the two-part nature of the test in some ways mimicked the Eighth Amend-
ment standard announced in Whitley, the jury instruction did not use the “malicious and sa-
distic” language, opting instead for “reckless[] disregard[].” See id.; supra text accompanying
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acquitted the officers.101 On certiorari, the Supreme Court sought to deter-
mine whether a subjective or objective standard applied to excessive-force
claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment—
that is, whether it was necessary that the defendants subjectively recognized
that the amount of force they employed was unreasonable.102
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer rejected the use ofWhitley’s sub-
jective “malicious and sadistic” standard in pretrial-detainee cases.103 The
holding built upon the doctrine announced in Bell: under the Fourteenth
Amendment, pretrial detainees cannot be punished at all.104 In Bell, the
Court explained that a pretrial detainee can prevail on a Fourteenth
Amendment due process claim by demonstrating either that officials had an
express intent to inflict punishment or that the officials’ actions were unre-
lated to or in excess of what was required to achieve a legitimate, nonpuni-
tive purpose.105 The Kingsley court affirmed that the general inquiry into
whether the allegedly punitive actions were justified by a legitimate purpose
can be conducted on the basis of objective evidence alone.106
But the Kingsley court did not entirely divorce a pretrial detainee’s due
process claim from the subjective intentions of prison officials. Justice Breyer
emphasized that the official must have actually intended to use force against
the pretrial detainee; an accident could not create liability.107 In Kingsley’s
case, if the prison guards removing Kingsley from his cell had unintentional-
ly tased him, Kingsley would not have had a constitutional claim.108 Once a
pretrial detainee has demonstrated that the application of force was in fact
intentional, however, the test for whether that force was excessive becomes
an objective inquiry: “[A] pretrial detainee must show only that the force
purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.”109
In making this objective determination, the factfinder should consider “the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene . . . at the time,” the legiti-
mate need to manage the facility in a safe and secure manner, and other fac-
note 65. However, in its brief to the Supreme Court, the state did argue that the “malicious and
sadistic” standard should apply. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2475. The Court rejected this test. Id.
101. Id. at 2471.
102. Id. at 2470.
103. Id. at 2475.
104. Id. at 2473–75; see also supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. Whether the pun-
ishment could be considered cruel and unusual was likewise irrelevant. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at
2475 (“[T]here is no need here, as there might be in an Eighth Amendment case, to determine
when punishment is unconstitutional.”).
105. Id. at 2473; see also supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
106. 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74.
107. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2472. Note that the Court explicitly reserved the question of
whether recklessly applied force would constitute grounds for a constitutional claim. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2472–73.
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tors designed to capture the relationship between the level of force used and
the nature of the threat.110
Kingsley announced an objective standard but left several questions un-
resolved. While the opinion drew heavily on Bell—a conditions case involv-
ing a pretrial detainee—the holding in Kingsley was limited to the use-of-
force context.111 The Court did not directly speak to the implications for its
historic treatment of Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment con-
ditions claims as functionally equivalent.112 Even if a different standard was
required for conditions claims brought by pretrial detainees (compared to
the standard for convicted prisoners), it was unclear what that standard
would be. One lesson from Wilson was that while subjective and objective
components were required for both conditions and use-of-force claims
brought by convicted prisoners, the precise contours of those standards var-
ied by type of claim113 How should courts modify the Kingsley use-of-force
standard to apply to claims challenging conditions of confinement? Section
II.A explores the way courts have begun to answer this question.
II. KINGSLEY ANDCONDITIONS
While Kingsley held that pretrial detainees need not prove subjective in-
tent to punish in the use-of-force context, courts of appeals have not uni-
formly applied this new standard to conditions claims.114 Even those courts
that do extend Kingsley to conditions claims brought by pretrial detainees
have interpreted the standard differently. Section II.A provides an overview
of those differences, as well as the courts of appeals cases that decline to ex-
tend Kingsley. Section II.B argues that even if those discrepancies are re-
solved in the best possible way for pretrial detainees, they will not be
adequately protected in light of the Peralta cost defense.115
110. Id. at 2473 (“Considerations such as the following may bear on the reasonableness
or unreasonableness of the force used: the relationship between the need for the use of force
and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer
to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the
threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.”).
111. Id. at 2473.
112. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 71–72 and accompanying text.
114. Kingsley also has the potential to unsettle Eighth Amendment use-of-force law for
convicted prisoners. Justice Breyer acknowledged this question in the opinion:
We acknowledge that our view that an objective standard is appropriate in the con-
text of excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees pursuant to the Four-
teenth Amendment may raise questions about the use of a subjective standard in the
context of excessive force claims brought by convicted prisoners. We are not con-
fronted with such a claim, however, so we need not address that issue today.
Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2476. For a normative and doctrinal case that an objective standard
should apply to use-of-force and conditions claims brought by both pretrial detainees and con-
victed prisoners, see Schlanger, supra note 40.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 78–85.
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A. Kingsley and Conditions in the Courts of Appeals
Since Kingsley was decided in 2015, commentators have predicted that
the extension of Kingsley would positively impact the chances of recovery
for pretrial detainees in conditions-of-confinement cases.116 Professor
Schlanger has suggested that the logic of Kingsley straightforwardly applies
to conditions-of-confinement claims—indeed, that any arguments related to
use of force apply even more strongly to conditions claims because officials
have more time for deliberation before acting.117 Kingsley itself strongly sup-
ports that conclusion; much of the argument for an objective standard in
Kingsley focuses on the no-punishment rule announced in Bell, a conditions
case.118
Despite the logic of that argument, however, courts of appeals have not
been uniform in whether and how to extend Kingsley to conditions claims
brought by pretrial detainees.119 Two recent cases concerning inadequate
medical care illustrate the split. The Eleventh Circuit in Dang ex rel Dang v.
Sheriff declined to apply Kingsley in a case where a pretrial detainee’s health
deteriorated before he was ultimately diagnosed with meningitis and suf-
fered a series of strokes, resulting in permanent injuries.120 When Dang
brought a § 1983 claim against the medical staff at the jail, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit dismissed Kingsley in a cursory note, declining to extend it beyond the
use-of-force context.121 The court also concluded that the staff had at most
behaved negligently, which it found would have been exculpatory of liability
even if Kingsley applied.122
116. See, e.g., Kyla Magun, Note, A Changing Landscape for Pretrial Detainees? The Po-
tential Impact of Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2059
(2016) (discussing the implications of Kingsley for suicide in jails); Deema Nagib, Note, Jail
Isolation After Kingsley: Abolishing Solitary Confinement at the Intersection of Pretrial Incar-
ceration and Emerging Adulthood, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2915 (2017) (discussing the implica-
tions for solitary confinement of young adults in jails).
117. Schlanger, supra note 40, at 410.
118. See supra notes 104–106 and accompanying text.
119. Compare Castro v. Cnty of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(Kingsley applies to a failure-to-protect claim when the inmate was assaulted by other inmates),
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2017) (Kingsley applies to general conditions of con-
finement such as overcrowding, sanitation, and nutrition), and Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888
F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2018) (Kingsley applies to the provision of medical care), with Alderson v.
Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2017), Dang ex rel Dang v. Sheriff, 871
F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2017), andWhitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2018).
120. Dang, 871 F.3d at 1276.
121. Id. at 1279 n.2 (“First, Kingsley involved an excessive-force claim, not a claim of in-
adequate medical treatment due to deliberate indifference. Therefore, it is not squarely on
point with and ‘does not actually abrogate or directly conflict with’ our prior precedent identi-
fying the standard we apply in this opinion to Dang’s claim.” (citation omitted) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009))).
122. Id. Other courts declining to extend Kingsley have also faced cases of mere negli-
gence, which may explain their hesitance, but also points to the continuing lack of clarity
around the standard. See Schlanger, supra note 40, at 411–12.
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The Ninth Circuit’s approach in Gordon v. County of Orange stands in
contrast to Dang.123 Gordon brought suit on behalf of a pretrial detainee who
died of complications from opioid withdrawal within thirty hours of enter-
ing detention.124 The court determined that the Kingsley standard applied to
conditions claims brought by pretrial detainees, overturning a grant of
summary judgment for the defendants because the district court had applied
a standard that required subjective intent.125 The court reasoned that claims
for conditions and use of force were both brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment and that there was no reason to treat conditions claims differ-
ently.126 In terms of the specific standard, the court interpreted Kingsley to
require the plaintiff to “prove more than negligence but less than subjective
intent—something akin to reckless disregard.”127
More specifically, the Gordon court outlined four elements of a success-
ful conditions claim by a pretrial detainee: (1) as in Kingsley, the defendant
must have undertaken some intentional act; (2) the actions by the defendant
must have put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm; (3) the de-
fendant must have failed to take “reasonable available measures to abate that
risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have ap-
preciated the high degree of risk involved”; and (4) that failure must have
caused the plaintiff’s injuries.128 According to the Gordon court, the officer
did not need to subjectively appreciate the risk, but the consequences of their
action must have been “obvious.”129
The Second Circuit has also extended Kingsley to pretrial detainees’
claims challenging their conditions of confinement, but it applied a slightly
different standard than the Ninth Circuit. In Darnell v. Pineiro, the court
held that defendants could be liable if they either intentionally imposed the
dangerous condition or “recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to miti-
gate the risk . . . even though [they] knew, or should have known, that the
condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.”130 While subjective in-
tent to punish could satisfy the standard, the court followed the logic of
Kingsley in finding that it was not required.131 The court also agreed with the
123. Gordon, 888 F.3d 1118.
124. Id. at 1121–22.
125. Id. at 1125.
126. Id. at 1124 (“Notably, the ‘broad wording of Kingsley . . . . did not limit its holding to
“force” but spoke to “the challenged governmental action” generally.’ ” (quoting Castro v. Cnty.
of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc))).
127. Id. at 1125 (quoting Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir.
2016) (en banc)). Castro was reheard en banc after Kingsley and was the first case in the Ninth
Circuit to apply its standard to conditions. See Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060
(9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
128. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125.
129. Id.
130. 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017).
131. See supra text accompanying note 105–106.
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Gordon court that negligence was not sufficient.132 As more courts of appeals
consider the issue, additional variations may come to the fore.
B. The Threat of Peralta’s Cost Defense
Even if all the courts of appeals ultimately extend Kingsley to conditions
claims brought by pretrial detainees, those detainees may still be vulnerable
to punishment due to the availability of the Peralta cost defense. Peralta in-
volved a convicted prisoner and, applying the Wilson precedent, relied on
ideas about subjective intent to punish.133 However, Peralta’s logic just as
easily applies when courts employ an objective standard. Kingsley allows
factfinders to consider the circumstances faced by guards in determining
whether the force applied was objectively unreasonable.134 It follows that
factfinders would similarly be able to consider resource constraints when
evaluating whether medical officials responded in an objectively reasonable
way to a detainee’s serious medical needs.
As a result, Peralta’s cost defense remains viable even if Kingsley is ex-
tended to conditions; removing the requirement of subjective awareness
does nothing to alter what constitutes an objectively reasonable response.
Applying the Gordon standard to the facts of Peralta illustrates the problem.
The first element of Gordon is satisfied by the defendant dentist’s choice not
to provide treatment—an intentional act that carried a substantial risk of
harm, namely the danger of severe pain and potential bone loss.135 The
claim, however, flounders in the same place as Peralta’s actual claim; the
Peralta court found that the dentist responded reasonably given the con-
straints he faced—there simply were not enough dentists to provide ade-
quate care.136 As interpreted by the Gordon court in the context of
conditions, the logic of Kingsley relaxes the standard from one in which the
official knows that the inmate faces a substantial risk (deliberate indifference)
to one in which a reasonable official should have known (civil reckless-
ness).137 But an official who responds reasonably can be insulated from lia-
bility under either standard.
132. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 36.
133. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. Interestingly, a “cost defense” was briefly
discussed inWilson—a conditions case involving a convicted prisoner. Justice Scalia refused to
consider whether such a defense might be valid because it had not been raised by the parties.
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1991). He noted, however, his strong skepticism about
whether policy-driven concerns about a cost defense could control the meaning of punishment
in the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 302. A possible implication is that policy concerns might be
viable outside of the Eighth Amendment context, but the opinion does not speak to that.
134. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
135. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc); id. at 1090 (Chris-
ten, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
136. Id. at 1082 (majority opinion).
137. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1994) (“The civil law generally calls a
person reckless who acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in the face of an unjusti-
fiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known. The crimi-
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At least one district court in the Ninth Circuit has applied the Peralta
cost defense while recognizing that Kingsley governs conditions. The plaintiff
in Dat Thanh Luong v. Napa State Hospital brought a § 1983 claim against
the state hospital and hospital officials, alleging that they were responsible
for her husband’s death in jail.138 Mr. Luong was a pretrial detainee who was
schizophrenic and had been found mentally incompetent to stand trial.139 In
July 2016, the court ordered that he be transferred from the state jail to a
hospital, but officials failed to do so.140 In October 2016, three months after
the transfer was ordered, Mr. Luong was strangled by his cellmate.141 The
court granted summary judgment for the individual defendants after finding
that they had no ability to expand capacity at the hospital, and thus could
not be held liable under Peralta.142 In a footnote, the court recognized that,
unlike in Peralta, an objective standard governed claims by pretrial detainees
but found this difference to be insignificant.143
The cost defense was not raised in Kingsley because of its focus on use of
force, and for now, Peralta’s cost defense has not been broadly extended out-
side of the Ninth Circuit.144 But the defense remains a viable option for gov-
ernments defending conditions claims across the country. And the COVID-
19 crisis, in exposing overburdened medical systems nationwide,145 makes it
more likely that defendants will emphasize their resource constraints in fu-
ture litigation over prison and jail conditions. While much of the early
COVID-19 related litigation has focused on the release of low-risk individu-
als in order to reduce the spread of the disease,146 the mounting loss of health
and life suggests that actions for damages may be prevalent in years to come.
For example, shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE) and
even basic cleaning supplies have been well-documented at jails and pris-
nal law, however, generally permits a finding of recklessness only when a person disregards a
risk of harm of which he is aware.” (citation omitted)).
138. 411 F. Supp. 3d 615 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
139. Dat Thanh Luong, 411 F. Supp. at 626–27.
140. Id. at 627–30.
141. Id. at 630.
142. Id. at 636–37.
143. Id. at 637 n.15 (“Peralta is an Eighth Amendment case about the rights of a convict-
ed prisoner, and not (as here) a Fourteenth Amendment case about the rights of a pretrial de-
tainee. Nevertheless, that distinction—while relevant in other contexts (e.g., objective or
subjective deliberate indifference)—is not relevant here.”).
144. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g. Sarah Kliff, Adam Satariano, Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Nicholas Kulish,
There Aren’t Enough Ventilators to Cope with the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/business/coronavirus-ventilator-shortage.html
[https://perma.cc/2SKR-YV5C].
146. See, e.g., Ariane de Vogue, Covid-19 Cases Concerning Prisoners’ Rights Hit the Su-
preme Court, CNN POL. (May 21, 2020, 7:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/21/politics
/covid-19-supreme-court-prisoners-rights/index.html [https://perma.cc/NG3F-VJNS]. Peralta
is clear that injunctive relief is available to detainees despite resource constraints—the cost de-
fense only applies to damages. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
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ons,147 and an obvious course for government defendants in these suits
would be to raise the cost defense. With even top hospital systems struggling
to obtain adequate PPE,148 courts may at the very least look for ways to con-
strain liability for similar failures in jails.149 But in dealing with the extreme
circumstances presented by COVID-19, there is a real danger that courts will
foreclose relief to a whole group of detainees, those for whom resource con-
straints are caused not by a global pandemic but by everyday dysfunction in
the criminal justice system.150 The crisis, however, also presents an oppor-
tunity to build in additional safeguards.
III. PROTECTINGDETAINEES IN LIGHT OF PERALTA
Dat Thanh Luong illustrates that even if Kingsley is applied to condi-
tions, pretrial detainees can still suffer objectively terrible outcomes without
remedy if a cost defense is available.151 As discussed in Section II.A, the
courts that have extended Kingsley to conditions apply slightly different
standards. This Part explains that, in light of Peralta, whether or not any of
these proffered standards can adequately protect pretrial detainees will ulti-
mately depend on how the standard handles issues of individual versus sys-
tem-wide liability (in other words, does it maintain a focus on individual
actors or allow for the aggregation of actions by multiple jail officials?).
The question of individual versus system-wide liability is important be-
cause of a pervasive problem in detention facilities—responsibility and
147. See, e.g., Luke Barr, Federal Prisons Facing Shortages of Resources Amid Coronavirus
Outbreak, ABCNEWS (Apr. 1, 2020, 4:16 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/federal-prisons-
facing-shortages-resources-amid-coronavirus-outbreak/story?id=69920966 [https://perma.cc
/H4T3-FCHN]; Alene Tchekmedyian & Matt Hamilton, L.A. Jail Inmates Say Lack of Soap and
Toilet Paper Heightens Coronavirus Fear: ‘Like Slow Torture,’ L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2020, 6:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-03-30/coronavirus-inmates-hygiene-
supply-shortage-la-jails [https://perma.cc/JX2Z-JWF3].
148. See, e.g., Robert King, Mayo Clinic CEO Blasts ‘Just-in-Time’ Ordering as Pandemic
Changes Supply Chain, FIERCE HEALTHCARE (July 7, 2020, 1:19 PM),
https://www.fiercehealthcare.com/hospitals/mayo-clinic-ceo-blasts-just-time-ordering-as-
pandemic-changes-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/S9D2-E9BB].
149. Cf. Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y. 1985) (using privity to limit the
liability of a public utility following widespread blackouts in New York City).
150. If the issue reaches the Supreme Court, it will find a changed majority that may be
particularly interested in cabining the reach of Kingsley. Kingsley was a 5–4 decision, with Chief
Justice Roberts authoring the dissent on behalf of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Justices
Kennedy and Ginsburg, who joined the majority, have since been replaced by Justices Ka-
vanaugh and Barrett, both of whom seem less likely to cast a vote for extending Kingsley to
conditions than their predecessors. See Priya Raghavan, Open Questions: Brett Kavanaugh and
Criminal Justice, BRENNAN CTR. (July 26, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/analysis-opinion/open-questions-brett-kavanaugh-and-criminal-justice [https://perma
.cc/UHM7-EWHB]; Joshua Vaughn, Amy Coney Barrett’s Record on Criminal Justice Is ‘Deeply
Troubling,’ Reform Advocates Say, APPEAL (Oct. 22, 2020), https://theappeal.org/amy-coney-
barretts-record-on-criminal-justice-is-deeply-troubling-reform-advocates-say/ [https://perma
.cc/9M4D-CE4H].
151. See supra text accompanying notes 138–144.
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knowledge are often fragmented.152 At best, jails and prisons are inefficient
bureaucracies where those who make budgetary decisions do not have the
information available to on-the-ground actors; at worst, the current liability
scheme incentivizes administrators to intentionally maintain this discon-
nect.153 In either interpretation, those who have the information about the
risks to detainees often do not have the power to control the resources neces-
sary to address those risks.
In cases involving officials responsible for the day-to-day conditions
faced by pretrial detainees, then, whether Kingsley applies may make little
difference. If Kingsley merely shifts from a subjective individual-liability
standard like criminal recklessness to an objective individual-liability stand-
ard akin to civil recklessness, it will not protect detainees from officials (like
those in Peralta) who respond reasonably given the constraints they face.
Solving the Peralta problem requires a standard that encompasses liability
for higher-level officials who are not themselves aware of the risks to detain-
ees but do have the ability to make resources available to address them. This
might mean employing a system-wide standard that divorces the intentional
actions of officials from the unreasonable conditions that result, or it might
mean expanding the circumstances under which courts are willing to say
that officials “should have known” about a risk.
The remainder of this Section considers these two approaches to safe-
guarding Kingsley’s promise in light of Peralta and finds both to be insuffi-
cient. Section III.B then proposes a third approach that addresses the
shortcomings of the first two, drawing on tort principles to impose an af-
firmative duty to notify as part of any reasonable response to a lack of re-
sources.
A. Evaluating Potential Solutions to the Peralta Problem
One possible system-wide approach comes from Kingsley’s distinction
between the official’s mental state as to his own actions and his mental state
as to the reasonableness of the force applied.154 Applying this distinction in
the conditions context, Schlanger likens an official’s decision to use force to
the decision to intentionally design the sanitation system for detainee hous-
ing and then argues that “[w]hen intentional decisions create objectively un-
reasonable conditions—whether or not anyone in particular exhibits
recklessness—Kingsley dictates that the conditions are unconstitutional.”155
152. Schlanger, supra note 40, at 420.
153. Id. If high-level officials can avoid liability for risks of which they are not aware, they
do not have an incentive to design better information-sharing systems.
154. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015) (“In a case like this one, there
are, in a sense, two separate state-of-mind questions. The first concerns the defendant’s state of
mind with respect to his physical acts . . . . The second question concerns the defendant’s state
of mind with respect to whether his use of force was ‘excessive.’ ”).
155. Schlanger, supra note 40, at 415.
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She then draws an analogy to products liability to illustrate the standard.156
Just as a manufacturer is liable when it intentionally sells a product that has
an objectively unreasonable risk (defect), prison officials should be liable
when they intentionally provide an underfunded, overworked (defective)
medical system and injury results.157
Unlike the Kingsley standard, Schlanger’s approach divorces the person
acting intentionally from the unreasonable effect of their action. In Kingsley,
the same official who undertook the intentional act of using the taser was in
a position to gauge whether that application of force was unreasonable given
the circumstances.158 When making the decision to act, he had all the infor-
mation that the factfinder would have in evaluating whether the action was
objectively unreasonable. In the conditions context, however, two different
actors could be involved—for example, the doctor who fails to provide ade-
quate treatment and the official who designs and administers the medical
system for pretrial detainees. Unlike the single-actor situation in Kingsley,
these two actors could have very different information. Specifically, the ar-
chitect of the system might not have information about the conditions creat-
ing an unreasonable risk on the ground. The only way such a liability scheme
could operate is if Schlanger is correct that recklessness by any particular in-
dividual is not required.159
There is little in the decisions that have extended Kingsley to conditions
to suggest that courts are contemplating an approach that dispenses with a
focus on individual actors. The Gordon court referred to “the defendant”
throughout: the defendant must have acted in a way that put the plaintiff at
risk of harm; the defendant must have failed to take reasonable measures to
abate the risk; the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position.160 The language is focused on the actions of individual
actors and does not appear to leave room for system-wide liability. The Dar-
nell standard at first appears more workable because it specifically allows
plaintiffs to bring claims if the defendant imposed the dangerous condition
intentionally or was reckless in doing so.161 But this reference to intent in-
stead seems to reflect the statement in Kingsley (drawing on Bell) that offi-
cials violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they intentionally act to
punish pretrial detainees.162 In other words, the language in Darnell refers
156. Id. at 416–17.
157. Id. at 417.
158. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2470, 2472.
159. Schlanger, supra note 40, at 415.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 128–129.
161. Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[T]he pretrial detainee must
prove that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or reck-
lessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pre-
trial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the
condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.”).
162. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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not to any intentional act but to an intentional act to punish. It is unclear
that the administrator who sets up the medical system intentionally imposes
the condition of inadequate care if he is not aware of the constraints on the
ground that might lead to an unreasonable result.
If a claim that relies on the actions of multiple actors is precluded, a
plaintiff could instead bring claims against the high-level officials who con-
trol resource allocation. In the case of medical care, such a claim would ig-
nore the doctor who must operate within defined constraints and focus on
administrators who oversee the budget or healthcare system. Again, infor-
mation-sharing problems have the potential to be quite prevalent under this
approach. Kingsley helps in some respect, because it eliminates the require-
ment that the defendant know about the serious risk,163 but any objective
standard short of strict liability will still require that the defendant should
have known about that risk. Kingsley itself says that the objective determina-
tion must be made based on “what the officer knew at the time, not with the
20/20 vision of hindsight.”164
There will presumably be situations where the plaintiff can show that
high-level officials should indeed have been aware of the risk and still re-
sponded unreasonably. But if jails do have severe information asymmetries,
high-level officials may simply be unaware of a risk, foreclosing any analysis
of whether they responded reasonably. In Peralta, for example, the plaintiff
also brought a claim against the prison’s chief medical officer, Doctor Fit-
ter,165 but the majority found that there was no reason he should have been
aware of the danger under the circumstances.166 The court added that, de-
spite the fact that Fitter supervised the dental department, his role was
“largely administrative,” and he did not have the training to “second guess[]”
the medical judgments of the dentists on staff.167
Focusing on these high-level officials, then, puts a great deal of pressure
on the word “should.” Does it require, for example, that the official not only
respond reasonably to the information before them but also design a better
system to share information? If staff do not make officials aware of resource
shortages, are officials required to second-guess their judgments? As long as
these questions are left unanswered, pretrial detainees will remain vulnerable
to permanent injuries and even death, with “no one left to sue.”168
163. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473–74.
164. Id. at 2473.
165. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
166. Id. at 1086 (“Peralta [hadn’t] shown that Fitter should have been aware of any risk to
Peralta’s health, let alone that Fitter actually was aware.”).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1098 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
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B. Rethinking the Reasonable Response
The language in Kingsley and the cases decided in its wake suggests that
courts are not ready to step away from an individual-focused standard of lia-
bility. When combined with the logic of Peralta, this implies that, even if
Kingsley is fully extended to conditions claims brought by pretrial detainees,
any individual-liability standard (other than strict liability) will leave gaps in
protection. Under Bell, there is no constitutional mandate that pretrial de-
tainees be made as comfortable as possible, only that they not be made to
endure “genuine privation[] and hardship.”169 But if the loss of a limb170 does
not constitute such an imposition, it is hard to imagine what would.
In order to increase protections for pretrial detainees while maintaining
the focus on individual actors, courts should impose an affirmative duty on
prison officials—such as on-the-ground medical staff—to notify their supe-
riors when they become aware of a risk to detainees due to inadequate re-
sources. Rather than putting the burden on detainees, who may not know
where to turn when they have serious unmet needs, courts should place the
burden on officials to demonstrate that they took reasonable measures to es-
calate their concerns. By rethinking what it means to respond reasonably,
courts could improve information sharing in detention facilities, while less-
ening the threat of Peralta’s cost defense.
Under this system, individuals who are or should be aware of a substan-
tial risk of harm to pretrial detainees would still be required to take reasona-
ble actions to address the risk using their existing resources. However, they
would also be required to notify those who are in a position to relax their re-
sources constraints. To further safeguard the rights of detainees, courts
should combine this affirmative duty to notify with a burden-shifting device
requiring the defendant to prove they took all reasonable steps to perform
that duty.
In the best-case scenario, the duty to notify would induce state actors to
allocate more resources to address poor conditions, avoiding the constitu-
tional violation entirely. A prison doctor working at capacity may not have
the power to provide additional care. But if he promptly and systematically
notifies administrators that detainees are not receiving adequate care, those
higher-level officials may be able to make adjustments even before the condi-
tions become so poor as to violate detainees’ constitutional rights.
But even if that is not possible, the plaintiff may still recover in situa-
tions where, under current doctrine, he could not. In a world where low-
level actors have an incentive to increase information sharing, high-level of-
ficials will lose their ability to invoke the defense of ignorance.171 It will be
much harder for an official like Doctor Fitter to argue that there was no rea-
son he should have known about Peralta’s risk when the dentist he supervises
169. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979).
170. Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1098 (Hurwitz, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
171. See, e.g., supra notes 166–168 and accompanying text.
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has expressly informed him of that risk. There will be no need to second-
guess his physicians when the information is provided in the first instance.
The plaintiff will be able to systematically shift liability up the chain of re-
sponsible individuals, until he reaches the officials who had the power to act
but failed to do so.
The approach would be consistent with prison litigation and broader le-
gal principles. Prison litigation is a rare realm where courts are willing to
impose affirmative duties.172 The logic for this exception is straightforward:
because of their incarceration, detainees are unable to freely act to meet their
own needs.173 As Justice Stevens argued fervently in his Estelle dissent, the
state has a duty to protect pretrial detainees because it has stripped them of
their ability to protect themselves.174
Justice Stevens’s argument is similar to tort law’s “voluntary undertak-
ing” exception to the lack of a duty to rescue. There is generally no affirma-
tive duty to intervene to save someone’s life, even if it is possible to do so
without taking on any individual risk.175 Once a person takes steps to get in-
volved, however, the situation changes, and from that point forward, they
have a duty to take reasonable actions to protect the victim from future
harm.176 Many voluntary-undertaking cases hinge on whether the defendant
removed the plaintiff from the scene or otherwise isolated them from help.177
For example, in Farwell v. Keaton, a teenager left his friend, who was badly
beaten, alone in the car in his grandparents’ driveway.178 When the friend
died of his injuries, the Michigan Supreme Court applied the voluntary-
undertaking exception and found that the defendant had an affirmative duty
to take reasonable measures to obtain medical care for his friend.179 The
Court reasoned that the defendant should have known that the plaintiff
172. Schlanger, supra note 40, at 418 (“[J]ail and prison are exceptions to the general rule
against constitutionalization of affirmative duties. Jail and prison render inmates unable to
protect themselves without state participation; they are unable to lock their doors, unable to
exit a threatening situation, unable to seek medical treatment, unable to buy food, and so on.”).
173. Id.
174. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 116 n.13 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If a State
elects to impose imprisonment as a punishment for crime, I believe it has an obligation to pro-
vide the persons in its custody with a health care system which meets minimal standards of
adequacy.”).
175. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARMS
§§ 37, 42 (AM. L. INST. 2012).
176. See, e.g., Hurd v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 2d 745, 771–72 (D.S.C. 2001) (holding
that the Coast Guard owes a duty to exercise reasonable care once it has commenced a rescue).
177. Affirmative duties also exist where there is a preexisting special relationship between
the defendant and the victim, such as a parent-child relationship, where the child is dependent
on the parent for its basic needs. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONALHARMS § 40.
178. 240 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Mich. 1976).
179. Farwell, 240 N.W.2d at 222.
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would not receive help from any other source.180 Likewise, jail officials and
staff should know that a pretrial detainee will not receive “help”—for exam-
ple, dental and medical care—from any source other than the jail itself.
Burden-shifting approaches are also common in tort and are appropri-
ate where there are information asymmetries.181 A newly incarcerated pretri-
al detainee is unlikely to know how to escalate his concerns when he does
not receive proper medical care and similarly is at a disadvantage in proving
officials failed to escalate those concerns properly in after-the-fact litigation.
But a jailhouse doctor knows who he should talk to when he is unable to
meet the urgent needs of all his patients and is likewise in the best position to
demonstrate that he did so. This approach puts the obligation to notify on
the individuals with the best ability to do so and creates an incentive for jail
officials to facilitate, rather than impede, information sharing.
There are limits to the level of protection provided by this solution. The
natural limit to any funding challenge is the sovereign immunity provided by
the Eleventh Amendment.182 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against
state officials—it does not permit a detainee to sue the state itself.183 At some
point, funding is outside of the control even of senior administrators, who
must rely on state legislatures for their budget.184 In those cases where offi-
cials at every step of the chain can demonstrate that they both acted reasona-
bly given the constraints they faced and fulfilled their duty to notify, the
plaintiff may still be left without a remedy.
For cases like Peralta, however, where Dr. Fitter was able to claim igno-
rance, this change in the standard makes a significant difference. The duty to
notify ensures that all those responsible in the chain of command are held
accountable for what is reasonably within their control and does not allow
ignorance to swallow the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. It in-
centivizes information sharing, rather than information fragmentation, rem-
edying the disconnect between those who have the power to act and those
who are aware of the risk.
180. Id. (“Siegrist knew or should have known when he left Farwell, who was badly beat-
en and unconscious, in the back seat of his car that no one would find him before morning.”).
181. For example, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is available in medical malpractice cas-
es when the defendant had exclusive control over the thing that caused the harm and the injury
is the kind of injury that does not normally occur without negligence. In these cases, the jury
may infer the element of breach without direct proof by the plaintiff. See, e.g., Kambat v. St.
Francis Hosp., 678 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1997). When there are multiple possible defendants, the
doctrine puts the burden on each defendant to demonstrate that they were not responsible for
the injury. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944) (“Without the aid of the doc-
trine a patient who received permanent injuries of a serious character, obviously the result of
some one’s negligence, would be entirely unable to recover unless the doctors and nurses in
attendance voluntarily chose to disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts estab-
lishing liability.”).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
183. BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 75.
184. Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Hurwitz, J., dis-
senting in part and concurring in part).
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Even when high-level officials are truly at the limits of their budgets, this
approach shifts the focus to elected officials who actually have the power to
change the constraints. While those officials cannot themselves be held liable
due to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, they can be
subject to increased public attention and accountability once the causes of
injuries are removed from the black box of bureaucracy.185 The criminal jus-
tice system has previously undergone significant reform when it became
clear that change could only come from the legislature.186 A doctrinal shift
that makes clear who is responsible when detainees die would allow advo-
cates to focus their attention on the actors who have the power to address the
root cause of those deaths.
CONCLUSION
While pretrial detainees are considered innocent until proven guilty,
that foundational principle does not guarantee them protection from serious
injuries or even death during the time they spend incarcerated prior to their
adjudication of guilt. In 1979, the Supreme Court declared that, far from
cruel and unusual punishments, pretrial detainees could not be punished at
all. And yet despite acknowledging this formal difference, courts functionally
treated these groups as interchangeable for decades.
That changed in 2015, when the Court decided Kingsley and determined
that, in the context of claims involving use of force, pretrial detainees need
only show that the force employed against them was objectively unreasona-
ble. Since Kingsley, some courts of appeals have begun to extend its logic to
claims by pretrial detainees challenging the conditions of their confinement.
Still, not all courts have adopted it.
185. On a more positive front, there is no reason this solution could not be available to
convicted prisoners as well. While we know that the provisions for pretrial detainees must be
higher than those provided to convicted prisoners, the dissents in Peralta make a strong argu-
ment that a cost defense also undermines protections for convicted prisoners. See supra notes
86–90. Jail administrators who house both pretrial and convicted detainees might welcome
uniformity, and there is no reason why an affirmative duty to notify could not be introduced in
the context of the subjective deliberate-indifference standard. If medical officials do not have
the resources to prevent “torture or a lingering death,” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103
(1976), it does not much matter whether they knew or should have known about that risk.
What matters is that they have an incentive to do something about it.
186. The Prison Rape Elimination Act was passed in 2003 after a report by Human
Rights Watch drew attention to the issue and the inadequacy of judge-made legal protections.
Brenda V. Smith, The Prison Rape Elimination Act: Implementation and Unresolved Issues, AM.
U. CRIM. L. BRIEF, Spring 2008, at 10; No Escape: Male Rape in U.S. Prisons, HUM. RTS.
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/prison/report.html [https://perma.cc/4PEZ-
N2XM]. More recently, the FIRST STEP Act was passed to help rectify the damage caused by
mandatory minimums in sentencing—a problem that the judiciary had been unable to solve on
its own. See Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law—And What
Happens Next, BRENNAN CTR. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
work/analysis-opinion/how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next
[https://perma.cc/P74L-H58W].
Rethinking the Reasonable Response
Whether Kingsley applies to conditions may make little difference in
light of the cost defense recognized by the Ninth Circuit in Peralta. If offi-
cials cannot be held liable when they do not have the resources to provide
adequate care, it matters little if they knew or should have known about the
detainee’s serious medical needs. Adequately protecting those needs means
changing the way courts think about the reasonable response. If the Court
recognizes the Peralta cost defense, it must impose an affirmative duty to no-
tify superior officials of resource constraints as part of the objectively rea-
sonable response required by Kingsley. This would eliminate the defense of
ignorance for high-level officials, while simultaneously ensuring that the
state makes available any additional capacity that exists.
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